Showing posts with label reimbursement. Show all posts
Showing posts with label reimbursement. Show all posts

Monday, June 6, 2011

Live From ASCO: Time To Cool Down?


It's day three of ASCO and the meeting is at a fever pitch, as the National Cancer Institute's Antonio Tito Fojo wryly observed during a panel on designing randomized controlled trials to achieve meaningful benefits. Not that it's an unusual state for the world's largest meeting on the largest field of drug development.

There is the typical fervor surrounding promising early data, a few major advances to report (for instance, the melanoma data from Roche and BMS covered by among others, the NYT, WSJ, Reuters, and, of course, "The Pink Sheet" Daily), and the meeting halls are packed with clinicians, investors, and journos. (Saturday's clinical science symposium on ovarian cancer had such throngs waiting for it to start that McCormick Place called in bouncers, from "Armageddon Security," nonetheless. And if you weren't in the initial crush, you probably got diverted to an overflow room. Or the second overflow room.)

Still, compared to other years, analysts aren't finding much to write home about. And, increasingly, the importance of the data being presented before packed meeting halls is being questioned. "We need to get away from things that add cost but not value," UnitedHealthcare's Lee Newcomer noted during a panel on health care reform.

Defining what value means, however, is a trickier subject.

Most clinical trials don't mean much for clinical practice, Ralph Meyer of Queen's University asserted at the plenary on randomized clinical trials. With all the controls and standardization, they represent the ideal – not real world practice. And registration studies are intended for that purpose.

In a talk called "Raising the Bar for Efficacy In Cancer Therapeutics," Alberto Sobrero, Head of the Medical Oncology Unit at Italy's Ospedale San Martino, took on whether or not those trials produce clinically meaningful data, or just go after statistical significance. Looking at the 15 pivotal Phase III trials for 9 biologics covering 8 different cancers approved over a 5-year period, he found that the hazard ratios (a statistical metric for calculating risk reduction) for progression-free survival and overall survival looked good at (respectively) 0.57 and 0.73. But when you considered the absolute gains of 2.7 and 2 months, the data were far less clear. Or as Sobrero put it, "Hmmm."

It's a complicated situation, he acknowledged. In an aggressive cancer like metastatic melanoma, a 0.8 HR would mean a 1.5 month gain – not really meaningful. But in breast cancer, that same 0.8 HR becomes worthwhile with a 6 month gain. So, both hazard ratios and absolute gain need to be considered --as well as the context of the specific tumor type-- when making a value judgement about a clinical benefit.

NCI's Fojo also questioned the significance of statistical significance. Paraphrasing an earlier researcher, he noted that if you torture data long enough, you can get it to confess to significance. Fojo found much of the clinical benefit shown in studies has marginal value. By definition, clinical benefit rate (CBR) is what you get when you add stable disease to partial and complete responses. Or, as Fojo put it, it's what you report when you have a drug that underperforms. It's "the corruption of an endpoint," he said.

Shrinking a tumor is good, he agreed, but unless it correlates with survival, stable disease does not mean anything. In prostate cancer, for instance, where some novel drugs have been reporting CBR, objective response rate (PR+CR) correlates highly with overall survival. But when you include patients that met stable disease criteria, the average benefit drops by more than half. "Because you're adding a parameter that has no value at all," Fojo said.

Of course, part of the concern is that these absolute gains aren't coming without costs. It's one thing for a drug to provide 2 months of life, quite another if it costs thousands of dollars and comes with toxicities. And given the proliferation of oncology drugs, there's more room for payers to actively manage the disease, benchmarking more expensive newer agents against cheaper, older ones, and using the ultimate metric --survival -- as the measuring stick. That's playing out at ASCO too, as Newcomer's comments indicate.

Unlike in the past, the skepticism of therapeutic value outlined in posters and abstracts isn't limited to the back corridors or the marginal sessions on clinical trial design and practice issues -- it's coming from the podium at scientific sessions. For instance, a review of recent Phase III trials in upper GI malignancies was organized around the theme of whether the findings were clinically meaningful or just statistically significant, and included a talk about the health care economics of treatment. (Hint: It wasn't pretty.)

It's all part of a larger trend toward more concentration on value, cost and payer issues as IN VIVO covered recently in the May 2011 issue.

It's great to see researchers and industry execs coming out of the convention with excitement about promising new pathways and the potential for combinations. But they should also start thinking harder about raising the bar. Otherwise climate change (of a reimbursement and/or regulatory nature) could spark a cool down in one of the hottest therapeutic areas of the industry.

Image courtesy of flickrer Joe Seggiola through a creative commons license.

Thursday, March 24, 2011

AZ's Payer Push No Help to Brilique in France

These days, you've got to schmooze with the payers as well as the regulators. AstraZeneca knows that; it has indeed been playing up its payer-focused strategy, with recent declarations of its bid to become "the number one company in terms of payer interactions," according to top AZ dealmaker Shaun Grady.

So it should have known that just because clot-buster Brilique was approved by the European authorities in December 2010, that wasn't the end of the story. And indeed, the French health technology assessment agency, known as the Transparency Commission, following a Jan. 19 review meeting, rejected the drug for reimbursement/pricing discussions. Hence AZ withdrew its submission.

The agency is concerned about the drug's side-effect profile, and was also influenced by FDA's lukewarm response to AZ's application for approval in the U.S.: FDA in December sent the company a complete response letter questioning the drug's efficacy in U.S. patients.

Fair enough; after all, the drug didn't seem to work among the U.S. cohort of AZ's 19,000-patient, multi-national Phase III trial. There are all sorts of discussions ongoing as to whether it's because the U.S. patients were on higher aspirin than those in other countries. According to AZ, the French want to see additional information, including clinical data contained within the company's response to the CRL, which was submitted on Jan. 21. (In other words, too late for the French meeting).

Anyway, the moral is that payers are likely to jump on concerns raised by any approval agency, even those outside their own territories. (We don't suspect France's concerns are anything to do with the fact that the genericizing competitor drug Plavix is ... well, French.)

It's tough luck for AZ, though, despite its best intentions (..."we're meeting payers' needs for value-based product differentiation by improving our ability to assess clinical and economic outcomes in real-world populations (as an example, earlier this year we announced a new outcomes study we were kicking off for Brilinta) declared an AZ spokesperson earlier this year).

France accounts for nearly a third of the market share for anti-platelet drugs in Europe, according to Sanford Bernstein analyst Tim Anderson. And AZ needs Brilique it faces expiries for Nexium and Seroquel. It also needs the drug to start generating revenues fast, because Plavix is either going or gone off patent.

AZ says it plans to supplement the Brilique reimbursement dossier and plans to resubmit to France's Transparency Commission within the coming months. Hopefully for it, the French set-back won't give FDA, set to rule by July 20, any further concerns. Anderson suggests in a March 23 note that "the odds of a negative ruling would seem to increase at least slightly."

Zut alors.

Update: AZ has corrected us on a couple of technicalities: The Transparency Commission didn't actually reject Brilique, they asked for additional information, and AZ withdrew its submission. Similarly, FDA wasn't questioning the drug's efficacy in U.S. patients, it was requesting additional analyses with respect to those patients. Sorry.

Monday, November 1, 2010

French Doctors' Deal Provokes Fuss, so It Must Be Working...

Funny what happens at Halloween. Yours truly was looking up the latest on the French doctors' pay-for-performance scheme, the CAPI (Contrat d'Amelioration des Pratiques Individuelles) and she comes across the Centre for Advanced Paranormal Investigation. Rather spookily Halloweenic.

In the real, mostly pumpkin-free world of biopharma, CAPI represents France's first step towards Anglo-Saxon capitalism: rewarding docs with good old cash when they hit their performance targets--targets aimed at lowering drug costs, boosting generics and improving outcomes. The scheme was introduced last year as part of a host of changes aimed at cutting the mega-deficit. (Read about other more recent measures here.)

As one has come to expect of our French neighbours, there was outrage when CAPI came along. Outrage from physicians' councils ("...contrary to ethical guidelines!"), and from the drug industry association ("...this will be a brake on innovation!").

A year on, however, the scheme is undoubtedly working. (In tough times, money speaks louder than principles.) After a strong start in mid-2009, it had pulled in almost 15,000 doctors by September 2010, according to Le Quotidien du Medecin.

And most of those are apparently doing what the scheme--which is voluntary, by the way--wants them to do: prescribe more generics, do more screenings and vaccinations. Two thirds of CAPI doctors have met their one-year objectives and received, on average, €3,101--or their "thirteenth month"'s salary, as the assurance maladie describes it.

But there's always a reason to complain, it seems. This time, the anger's with the one third of CAPI-affiliated docs (about 1700) that didn't get their money. It's a scam, say some. Others claim the measures on which docs are assessed are inappropriate and unreliable. And besides, they ask, how can the same body that sets the objectives for the scheme be the one to measure whether those objectives have been met?

We'll spare you most of the details (you can read about some of them, in French, here). One complaint that seems fair, though, is that the authorities, in setting the scheme's objectives (in terms of numbers of diabetics remaining compliant, number of mammograms carried out, for example) didn't control for the prevalence of these particular diseases in particular areas. So for some doctors it might be much easier to clock up the figures than for others.

But all this misses the more important point that CAPI is working. It's making doctors prescribe more generics (generic prescription targets are set at 90% for antibiotics, at least 80% for PPIs and 70% for statins) and it's making them more aware of long-term outcomes. So assuming that happy doctors with a bonus continue to outweigh unhappy ones without (and encourage the unhappy ones to try harder rather than to have a tantrum and pack it all in), CAPI--the non-paranormal version--may yet prove an important component of France's ongoing attempts to rein in the deficit. Spooky.

image from flickr user ...antonio... used under a creative commons license.

Monday, May 24, 2010

When Innovation Isn't Enough

There is always a self-congratulatory flavor to bio’s annual meeting. Which is as it should be: it’s the lobbying group’s best venue for justifying its membership dues.

And I think they have – with exhibit 1 being their clever R&D tax credit, a $1 billion piece of reform money to provide a few hundred biotechs with non-dilutive cash most can’t get anywhere else.

And yet I still can’t shake the feeling that, by and large, BIO’s leaders – or maybe bio’s members – are fighting the last war, over innovation, when the new fight is all about value.

Even a political idiot like me can get why Jim Greenwood reads gushing letters from patients about drugs that have saved their lives. And given just how few important biotech medicines have gotten approved lately, I understand why Dendreon’s Provenge gets a prominent mention. And I also get why Greenwood didn’t mention its cost ($93K for a full course of therapy). He would then have had to explain just how Dendreon calculated that Provenge will be cheaper than Taxotere per-month-of-life-saved (on theoretical average, Provenge gives you an extra three). Which would have been kind of boring.

But why wasn’t the Provenge price front and center in the more purely business speeches about cancer products (or frankly any biological therapy)? Given just how often people gave passing nods to the needs of payers (e.g., in Steve Burrill’s theories-of-everything talk), you’d figure that the Provenge price might be a relevant topic. Pricing is at least passingly important to a product’s commercial prospects and so apparently exceptional pricing might indeed be worth a chat, whether you think that price bodes well or ill for the industry (e.g., the Provenge price will be a) the straw that breaks the camel’s back or b) another gold nugget that shows just how strong the camel’s back still is or c) a meaningless topic because Dendreon, supply constrained, is only going to sell a few thousand therapies so total costs for any one payer won’t rise to a meaningful level). But I heard nothing about it.

Or let me put this another way. Greenwood said that "the recent recession and policy hurdles” hadn’t “diminished our passion to innovate.” First, I don’t think most investors or, frankly, executives would agree. For most VCs I know, passion for pharmaceutical innovation has turned into a massive case of indigestion (to continue the gastro-intestinal metaphor: VC portfolios are clotted with innovative companies).

But more importantly have Greenwood’s “recession and policy hurdles” increased our willingness to prove value – which isn’t the same thing as novelty and which Greewood’s r&ph will certainly require?

I don’t get the sense that drug companies have done much to show that they see the difference. (Full disclosure here: I’m now so interested in this subject that I’m part of a group exploring a new company focused on it.)

Innovation, by and large, can be judged pretty objectively. A new mechanism is innovative. A new compound too. But value is subjective – what’s valuable to you may be burdensome to me. Yet the industry’s main arbiter of value, clinical trials, too often proves value to only one audience: regulators.

That audience is certainly crucial. But everything we’ve learned over the last year says that a regulatory audience is hardly predictive of what other equally crucial audiences want: Lilly’s Effient, Bristol/AZ’s Onglyza and J&J’s Simponi and Ultram ER all provide customers with – well, given their commercial performance, very little they’re willing to pay the price for.

This isn’t to say that these drugs’ suppliers couldn’t create the necessary value. It’s to say that they haven’t, at least in part because they’re focused on just one audience.

Instead of simply proving that a pain drug reduces pain without causing other big problems, maybe the trial should prove that the pain drug does something the payer wants from it – maybe a reduction in follow-up visits to the doctor to get another pain drug. Or delays the prescription of an opioid. Or allows a generic to be used in most cases. Or shows that a GP, after a relatively low-cost visit, can prescribe the product without sending the patient along for specialist follow-up. Or can avoid an expensive diagnostic procedure. A me-too cancer drug (and there are plenty of them in development) could justify premium pricing by measuring, along with whatever purely clinical data it needs for approval, reductions in hospital-acquired infections, or length-of-stay.

I spoke with one CEO who told us that the nurses in hospitals testing his oncology drug loved it because they spent less time cleaning up after patients nauseated by the standard of care. I asked: Are you measuring how much less time they’re spending? No, he said.

Biotech wants to be paid like it’s always been paid: for promises of novelty. I’d be curious to hear a biotech claim that it should be paid, as the UK’s NICE pays for Millennium/J&J’s Velcade, when the drug delivers the value the payer and patients want. That value could be a particular medical outcome, or better quality of life, or lower medical costs. Or something that makes the payer’s services more attractive to the employers its competing with other payers to win as clients. But it isn’t necessarily whether it’s clinically better than placebo. Or even standard of care. Effient’s head-to-head trial against Plavix proved – in crude summary – that it’s clinically better. But payers clearly don’t see enough value to justify switching away from a drug soon to be generic.

So my suggestion: if bio really wants to promote the long-term health of the biotech industry (and the broader pharma business as well), maybe the theme for the next convention should focus on customers.

How about “What’s In It for Me?”

image from flickr user zizzy used under a creative commons license