The CEDD is Dead. Long Live the TAU

We've now entered a new chapter in the book of GlaxoSmithKline's 'Really Useful Abbreviations For The Way We Organize Our R&D'. In case you missed it: the CEDDs are dead. It's official. The Centers of Excellence for Drug Discovery, therapy-area focused groups spanning discovery through proof-of-concept, which flew onto the scene post-merger in 2001, are gone.

Back in the naughties, the CEDDs were considered quite radical, buzzing of smallness, accountability, and autonomy -- at least relative to the highly centralized, over-corporate, lots-of-corners-to-hide-in-style R&D of the time. They went on to inspire a host of similar initiatives elsewhere.

Now the CEDDs look sooo last decade (although we think the externally-facing CEEDD is still around). This decade the new acronym is fully-integrated Therapy Area Units (TAUs) -- five of them, covering Metabolic Pathways and Cardiovascular, Respiratory, Infectious Diseases, Immuno-inflammation, Neurosciences and Oncology R&D.

We knew which way the wind was blowing when we wrote this January IN VIVO feature. Even then it was clear GSK's R&D chairman Moncef Slaoui and SVP Medicines discovery & development Patrick Vallance wanted to move on from the notion of any sort of divide between pre- and post-proof-of-concept, the point at which the CEDDs passed suitable candidates onto the Medicines Development Centers (MDCs) for the really expensive work.

Slaoui and Vallance instead wanted full visibility from discovery through to registration and reimbursement -- not least so that payer requirements and commercial reality weren't an after thought simply pasted on in Phase III, but could actually influence which discovery programs to advance.

But don't assume the TAUs are a hark back to the pre-CEDD days of large sluggish R&D groups. That would be to forget the DPU chapter (you've still got your acronym cheat sheet right?) By 2008, these even smaller, even nimbler, even more accountable so-called drug performance units (DPUs) had begun to supercede their CEDD cousins. And given there were always a couple of standalone DPUs -- like Ophthiris in ophthalmology, for instance -- one reckons they were a harbinger of the evolving GSK.

Today, these DPUs -- which came complete with investment boards and three-year, milestone-linked funding cycles -- remain the R&D building blocks within GSK. It's just that now they have highly porous borders with downstream development. (And they're also spawning external versions, too, like the academic discovery performance unit set up at Cambridge University.)

So who are the new TAU chiefs? By and large, they're whoever won the battle between the CEDD-head and MDC-head in that particular therapy area: Zhi Hong (CEDD) in infectious diseases; Dave Allen (CEDD) in respiratory, Murray Stewart (MDC) in Metabolic Pathways & Cardiovascular, Perry Nissen in Oncology R&D (so-named because oncology is fully-integrated all the way through commercial, as at Novartis and Sanofi-Aventis). The Immuno-inflammation TAU chief has been appointed from academia but hasn't started yet, and Neurosciences apparently still has two heads.

Almost certainly, TAUs -- whose fully-integrated philosophy is also apparent within Sanofi Aventis' Therapeutic Strategy Units (TSUs?), while AstraZeneca's iMeds are more CEDD-like -- won't be the last chapter in this book. (How would consultants earn their keep?)

The next exciting bit to look forward to, though, is when the 3-year DPU funding cycle comes to an end later this year. That might kill off a few poorly-performing DPUs; indeed, "until and unless GSK actually shuts something down, no one will see the connection between data and funding, and really 'get' the model," opined one external advisor.

Slaoui isn't about to do any culling just to relay a message, though. "I may terminate a DPU even if [it] reaches [its] numbers, because the biggest limitation to numbers is that they don't [necessarily] reflect quality," he said. So by next year a few DPUs may slip away, or be tweaked...but we reckon the overall DPU concept has somewhat longer to run.

image by flickrer purplenina used under creative commons

In Search Of A Golden Mean: Balancing Innovation And Execution In Biopharma

Guest post by Dr. David Shaywitz

As the biopharmaceutical industry looks to revitalize itself through innovation, a lot of companies have started to think deeply about what it means to be more innovative. In today’s WSJ, I review an interesting new book by Peter Sims called Little Bets that discusses the importance of deliberate experimentation in innovation and highlights the role of thoughtful improvisation in driving progress.

The difficulty, as I see it, isn’t that most people fail to appreciate the value of trying new things, and more generally, pursuing a portfolio of options. Rather, it’s that almost everyone wants to be the one doing the diversifying, and often wants the entities within their portfolio (companies, programs, people) to execute in a lean and focused fashion.

For example, growth investors generally want their companies to relentlessly pursue a specific thesis, often high risk/high reward; for these investors, each company in their portfolio is a small bet. But most companies prefer to diversify and hedge their risk – statistically safer for them, but not necessarily what their investors had in mind. The pattern extends down through project teams even to the level of an individual employee, who must balance pursuit of promised objectives with the ability to pivot if something changes. In each of these situations, everyone understands the value of small bets – the issue is that each person wants to be the one holding the cards.

From a management perspective, the dilemma is that in the short term, investing in game-changing “disruptive” innovations are a drag on the balance sheet. Organizations are always seeking ways to cut costs; this is especially true these days for pharma companies, as they anticipate patent expiries. Without a serious long-term commitment, and mandate, from senior management, pursuit of such so-called “non-core” activities face serious, even prohibitive, challenges. (See this thoughtful HBR piece by Clay Christensen and colleagues for an excellent discussion of how the financial value of disruptive innovation is systematically underestimated.)

It’s also critical to recognize the very real limitations of constant experimentation – the success of any innovation requires not just a promising idea, but also focused and determined execution. I imagine someone could write a parallel volume to “Little Bets” (and probably several exist already) arguing that it’s all about execution, and that in practice, the actual limitations on innovative success are the fortitude to stay with a difficult idea, grinding through the sweat and tears to ensure it becomes a reality.

Such perseverance is as vitally important in academia as it is in business – I can think of many graduate students who were brimming with potentially interesting ideas, but were never able to muster the focus needed to shepherd any individual idea through the necessary period of unglamorous, gritty exploration, and would instead constantly jump to something new.

By contrast, the most successful academics I know are relentless about following up promising ideas, ensuring they are adequately developed and successfully published. (I suspect there are actually far more academics whose career success results from the dogged pursuit of mediocre ideas than from the tepid pursuit of great thoughts.)

The obvious answer, of course, is that it’s all about balance – both exploration and execution are essential, and you need to know when to do each. But therein lies the rub. Consider this disturbing thought: perhaps it’s not really possible for anyone to know, for any particular situation, just what the right balance is. Arguably, “the right balance” is largely dependent upon randomness, externalities that are impossible to foresee despite one’s best guesses, and potentially out of one's control.

Nevertheless, the success stories will be captured in business books, case studies,and on the “analog” slides so popular among consultants and bankers; the wins will be attributed to brilliant thinking (and implicitly, to great advice), while the failures (though frequently the result of similar advice and a similar strategy) will quickly be forgotten. (See The Halo Effect by Phil Rosenzweig, or Fooled by Randomness by Nassim Taleb for a more complete discussion of these issues. Additional books recs can also be found here.)

I continue to believe -- strongly – that good management matters; while you may not always be able to make good decisions, you can certainly avoid making some very bad ones. In biopharma, specifically, I deeply believe in the value of--and absolute requirement for--effective execution, but I remain passionate about the primacy of good new ideas, the value of R&D, and the importance of innovation. I’ve witnessed the “innovation dissipation” that can occur in large corporate structures that kill new ideas not by fiat but through stultifying bureaucracy, onerous processes, and falsely precise spreadsheets and modeling, as previously discussed here.

It’s not surprising that some of the most innovative leaders carefully protect nascent ideas from institutional antibodies, especially those associated with productivity metrics. Sims writes that at Amazon, “when trying something new, Jeff Bezos and his senior team (known as the S Team) don’t try to develop elaborate financial projections or return on investment calculations.‘You can’t put into a spreadsheet how people are going to behave around a new project,’ Bezos will say.”

Similarly, Mark Fishman, head of R&D at Novartis, has reportedly banished the use of sales forecasts from early research, and (in a stimulating 2008 HBR article by Amabile and Khaire) has derided Six Sigma as “one device that has destroyed more innovation than any other,” adding that efficiency-minded management “has no place in the discovery phase.”

Steve Jobs’s dictum, “People don’t know what they want if they haven’t seen it” seems especially relevant for drug development, as huge resources are spent trying to figure out what patients and physicians want, yet the ability of such market research to anticipate the value of a novel product is notoriously poor, as discussed in this JCI article by former pharma VP Jose Cuatrecasas. (I’ve yet to meet a senior pharma commercial executive who will acknowledge this limitation.)

Overconfidence in forecasting turns out to be a more general problem, as concisely summarized by noted University of Chicago behavioral economist Richard Thaler in this NYT piece.

Innovation continues to matter for Big Pharma. But, as Anthony Nicholls notes, simply restructuring themselves in the image of biotechs may not be the magic answer. It's worth noting there’s little evidence that biotechs are any more productive than big pharma. It’s just that they often evaporate when they fail, and their losses tend to be invisible, rather than accounted for on a balance sheet, as HBS professor Gary Pisano discusses in his book Science Business.

I’ve seen so many people within big pharma who were attracted by the opportunity to make important new medicines, and who still, despite everything (including the formidable internal challenges as well as the relentless attacks of the pharmascolds), maintain this worthy ambition.

The challenge for top pharma leaders -- a challenge that I’m not sure most big pharma execs either fully appreciate or deeply believe -- is to recognize this potential, engage these aspirations, and support and enable these latent innovators, before it is too late.

Dr. Shaywitz is a strategist at a biopharmaceutical company in San Francisco and an Adjunct Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. He is a regulator contributor to Science Business at Forbes.

(Image courtesy of flickrer Digitalnative used with permission through a creative commons license.)

No Room for RNAi in Roche's Operational Excellence Plans

Tucked inside Roche's months-awaited announcement today containing details on its restructuring program (and the loss of 4,800 jobs, mostly in the US and mostly in pharma) is a nugget that will make RNAi-watchers gulp. Three years on from its landmark deal with Alnylam in the field of RNA interference, Roche is shutting down all of the discovery for which it paid so dearly.

That deal with Alnylam included $331 million in up-front payments and -- in addition to non-exclusive rights to Alnylam's IP in four therapeutic areas -- bought Alnylam's European research site in Kulmbach, Germany. Roche now says it will shutter Kulmbach and all its other RNAi work:

Following a comprehensive portfolio review, Roche will discontinue certain activities in research and early development. These include RNA interference research in Kulmbach, Germany, and in Nutley, New Jersey, and Madison, Wisconsin, in the US. In addition, plans also include reorganising certain internal functions to free up resources for upcoming phase II studies of new molecular entities. Approximately 600 positions will be affected.

Adding to Roche's woes, the 5% stake it took in Alnylam in 2007 -- at $21.50 per share (a 40% premium at the time) -- was subject to a three-year lockup and is now way under water. If there's RNA interference activity in Roche's future, it's hard to divine where. Roche CEO Severin Schwan was clear on a call this morning with investors: "We plan to exit ... our siRNA efforts," he said. Nobody pressed him further during the Q&A. Case closed.

The news comes on the heels of Novartis' decision in late September to not exercise an option that would have given it Roche-like access to Alnylam's platform for the relatively low sum of $100 million. Novartis remains committed to RNAi drug development, the companies noted at the time, and is pursuing RNAi therapies against what it calls its "full and final" list of 31 targets. But the Novartis news prompted Alnylam's own restructuring. The RNAi pioneer said it was laying off 25-30% of its workforce.

So where do these Swiss stances leave Alnylam -- not to mention other RNAi hopefuls including Roche's other partner Tekmira? Alnylam was ready with a response, expressing disappointment and surprise at Roche's decision. At the very least, these moves suggest that signing new blockbuster deals will be difficult. But it has never been clearer that Alnylam will no longer live or die based on its ability to sign monster non-exclusive platform deals: it's now a drug developer. The real risk is that Roche's decision, and to some extent Novartis', reflect a broader belief in a bleak clinical future for RNAi therapeutics. With human proof-of-concept data not too far away, we won't necessarily have to wait long for a glimpse.

Meanwhile, Alnylam's market cap languishes below $500 million, and the company announced earlier this month that its still-impressive cash pile was $372 million. That's historically low value ascribed to the company's IP, dealmaking potential, future milestones and royalties, and clinical pipeline.

The field of RNAi needs a win, and badly. Merck, the other big pharma to take a big leap into the space with its $1.1 billion acquisition of Sirna back in 2006, says astonishingly little about its therapeutic progress there (and siRNAs are absent from its pipeline chart). Now and then a rumor that someone's going to pony up money to buy the UK's Silence Therapeutics bubbles to the surface, and just as surely recedes again. RXi is committed to delivering for its investors a deal by the end of 2010. Time is running out on that promise. The next generation RNAi play Dicerna has demonstrated that it can pull in investors, but it has yet to enter the clinic with its dicer-substrate molecules.

RNAi may not succeed as a therapeutic modality. More likely, it just needs time to mature, to solve its delivery problems, to gain traction in the clinic. Whether or not any Big Pharma or investors are willing to wait for that remains to be seen.

Deals Of The Week Gets Exclusive

Commitment is such a weighty decision, isn’t it? Whether it’s high schoolers obsessed about going steady or 30-somethings who stay over three nights a week but refuse to stash their extra underwear in an available drawer, making the choice to be exclusive is hard. What if things don’t work out? Gulp.

In biopharma land, exclusivity is no less thorny a subject, especially when it relates to options-to-acquire. This week news comes that Novartis, which alongside Cephalon remains one of the most active in inking this specific flavor of option-based deals, is at it again. On November 11, Novartis said it had taken an option either to buy San Diego-based Aires Pharmaceuticals outright or license the biotech’s mid-stage treatment for pulmonary arterial hypertension called Aironite.

Along with the option announcement, Aires said it reeled in a $20 million Series B financing, enough money to finish Phase II trials of Aironite, a nitric oxide prodrug that causes vasodilation and has anti-inflammatory properties. Novartis didn’t officially take part in the financing, but it has ties nonetheless. That’s because the new investor, MPM Capital, made the investment out of its MPM Bio IV NVS Strategic Fund (try saying that three times fast), a side-car fund backed by—you guessed it—Novartis. Existing Aires backer ProQuest Investments also participated in the round.

Details surrounding the option are murky. We know that Novartis paid a separate fee for the right to acquire Aires after it successfully completes Phase II studies of Aironite and, all-in, the deal price could reach $250 million. But the price of the option remains undisclosed, as do values for the initial acquisition payment and the regulatory and sales milestones.

Since its formation in 2007, the MPM/Novartis fund has signed at least eight option deals, including the recent Aires transaction, according to Elsevier’s Strategic Transactions. The Aires deal hews closely to a familiar formula designed to give Novartis an advantage at the deal-making table. Except for the overall buy-out price, the Aires news is reminiscent of Novartis’ March 2009 option-to-acquire Proteon Therapeutics for up to $550 million. That deal, contingent on Proteon’s ability to demonstrate proof-of-concept with its Phase I/ II recombinant human elastase, was also announced concurrently with the first tranche of Proteon's $50 million Series B financing.

Given the cash constraints privately-held start-ups face, option-type deal making has become more common. Such deals might cap investor upside, but the additional non-dilutive cash and greater certainty of an exit mean it’s an offer investors have a hard time refusing.

But as anyone who's watched a Mafia flick can tell you, "hard to refuse" isn't the same as "popular." Some VCs and biotech executives worry that the Novartises of the world will try and wiggle out of the pre-agreed upon terms that trigger an alliance or acquisition. Indeed, there is recent precedent.

In 2007, Radius optioned its mid-stage osteoporosis medicine, BA058, to Novartis for $10 million. According to the terms of the deal, once Radius announces Phase II data for BA058, the big pharma has 90 days to evaluate the information before making a go/no-go decision. At the end of the option period, Novartis can say “no” and walk away, leaving Radius to shop the product to anyone they want, or “yes” and trigger the pre-negotiated deal. The thing is, Radius announced its Phase II data in August 2009, and there’s been no nay or yeah about the option in the intervening period. Math may not be this blogger’s strongest suit, but even a nine-year old can calculate that a decision from Novartis is a year overdue.

Indeed, there’s little clarity on whether any of the options associated with the MPM/Novartis fund have actually been exercised, even though a number of them have undoubtedly reached critical decision points. Does Novartis’ decision regarding BA058say anything about the long-term viability of the option model?

Maybe yes. Maybe no. (Depending on the daisy--er, asset-- it's a little bit like playing effeuiller la marguerite.)Given current uncertainties in the marketplace, it’s a fair bet option-style deal making isn’t going away. And for the cynics in the readership, there are happy endings: Purdue Pharma and Cephalon recently exercised prior options associated with their respective tie-ups with Infinity Pharmaceuticals and BioAssets Development Corp.

Ultimately commitment is a leap of faith—or at least a flying leap. Here at IN VIVO Blog we’ve got your exclusive line-up of deal making news. It’s time for another edition of…


Clovis Oncology/Clavis Pharma: News flash! IN VIVO Blog has learned that several other firms were also involved in this deal: Cleavis, which is working on DNA repair mechanisms; Clyvis, an under-the-radar Scottish start-up; and Clivus, with the latest advances in phrenology! Of course we jest. The real deal here is just between Clovis and Clavis, announced Nov. 11, and it expands upon the November 2009 tie-up that saw Clovis pay Clavis $15 million upfront for partial rights to CP-4126, a reformulated gemcitabine currently in Phase II for pancreatic cancer. The reformulation with Clavis's Lipid Vector Technology aims to promote gemcitabine uptake in patients with low levels of the nucleoside transporter protein hENT1, which normally allows gemcitabine into cancer cells. Several studies suggest a significant percentage of pancreatic cancer patients, perhaps up to 67%, have low levels of hENT1, and the partners are working on a companion diagnostic to sort low- from high-hENT1 patients. With the expanded deal, Clovis pays $10 million immediately for full global rights, plus $30 million in Asian milestones and up to $165 million in sales milestones. Clovis is still on the hook for the $365 million in milestones attached to the development and commercial rights it originally bought for North America, South America and Europe. -- Alex Lash

GlaxoSmithKline/Xenoport: The partners on the restless-leg syndrome (RLS) treatment Horizant said Nov. 8 they had amended their February 2007 agreement to give the San Francisco Bay Area biotech the right to pursue development of the drug for diabetic peripheral neuropathy (DPN) and additional indications in the US. All ex-US rights previously granted to GSK have reverted back to Xenoport, as well, and the firms have made undisclosed financial adjustments in milestones and royalty rates to reflect the new responsibilities. GSK remains responsible for US approval of Horizant – formerly known as Solzira and burdened with a track record of clinical and regulatory misses – for restless-legs syndrome and post-herpetic neuralgia. The drug failed a Phase II trial for DPN in 2009, then FDA rejected Horizant for RLS in February 2010, issuing a complete response letter and prompting investors to bail on Xenoport. But FDA has accepted GSK's response and has issued a new PDUFA date of April 6, 2011. Under the original deal, GSK paid Xenoport £40 million upfront, promised up to £298 million in milestones, and sales royalties. -- A.L.

Eli Lilly/Avid Radiopharmaceuticals: Lilly announced a deal this week, but not the blockbuster M&A investors have been hankering for. Even as ratings agencies downgrade the Indianapolis pharma, Lilly is sticking to its strategic guns, replenishing its pipeline with bite-sized transactions centered on late-stage assets. The company’s decision Nov. 8 to purchase Avid Radiopharmaceuticals, a privately-held diagnostics company that specializes in the detection of chronic diseases through brain imaging, is further evidence of Lilly’s mindset. It also shows that despite the risks of Alzheimer’s drug development (semagacestat, anyone?), Lilly still believes in this therapeutic arena. Lilly will pay $300 million upfront to acquire all outstanding shares of Avid and another $500 million tied to regulatory and commercial milestones to get its hands on the biotech’s molecular imaging agent, florbetapir F18, which is pending FDA approval. While such a large sum isn't unusual for a biotech with a late-stage asset in a valuable therapeutic area like oncology, it's almost unprecedented in the diagnostics arena, where M&A targets generally have marketed assets and are acquired not by drug companies but by fellow diagnostics specialists. Given the risks associated with Alzheimer's, technologies that help prevent costly late-stage failures like semagacestat are worth a premium. And Lilly, determined to push forward its remaining Phase III Alzheimer's drug, the antibody solanezumab, certainly can’t afford to repeat its semagacestat outcome. But those peculiarities mean the startling deal price for Avid is likely the exception rather than the rule. Meantime, Avid’s backers, which include Safeguard Scientifics, Alta Partners, Pfizer Strategic Investment Group, and Lilly's own corporate venture group, can celebrate a tidy exit. Based on the deal’s upfront alone, investors stand to realize an estimated 4x return on their venture, having put in just under $70 million since Avid’s 2004 founding. -- Lisa Lamotta and E.L.

Pfizer/Biovista: This week’s deal between Pfizer and Biovista illustrates yet again the thrifty mindset at work in the halls of the the biggest pharmas. To discover additional uses for existing compounds, Pfizer has inked a pilot research collaboration with privately-held Biovista that gives the big drug maker access to the service firm's proprietary datamining technology, which uncovers potential utility in various therapeutic areas, including oncology, ophthalmology, metabolic disease, and CNS disorders. Biovista will collaborate with Pfizer’s Indications Discovery Unit to identify up to three novel indications for each of the Pfizer candidates being evaluated. In return, Pfizer will pay Biovista an undisclosed upfront payment and success-based milestones. Biovista has inked numerous partnerships around its technology, including one earlier this year with the FDA to help regulators identify and understand the mechanisms resulting in adverse events. Biovista isn't content to remain a service play; in 2009, the firm started its own drug development program based on repositioned compounds in CNS diseases. Pfizer, meanwhile, continues to try to wring value from every compound in its research pipeline. This is the second repositioning deal the behemoth has inked in 2010 alone. In May, it announced it was teaming up with Washington University in a $22.5 million, five year collaboration designed to find new uses for a 500-compound Pfizer data set. -- E.L.

Image courtesy of flickrer dmixo6 under a creative commons license.

DotW: Navel Gazing

It was a week of painful navel-gazing from many in the venture community, as some of the industry’s best and brightest gathered in Napa for the annual C21 Bioventures conference at the Meritage Resort.

A panel of VCs kicked off the event with a gloom-and-doom overview of the private financing world. As Ilan Zipkin, a partner with Prospect Ventures succinctly put it, "It’s a good thing we’re not holding this meeting in San Francisco. Here in Napa there are no bridges to jump off."

Ouch. Are things really that bad in private biotech land?

As we’ve been pointing out for some time, for VCs, the answer is yes. Funds raising money now are having a tough time and the expectation is future fund sizes will be smaller too, with returns down across the board. As InterWest Partners’ Chris Ehrlich put it: "People feel worse about themselves. LPs, the life blood of capital for venture, are saying the role of VC an asset class is limited. That casts a pall." Ehrlich likened the current climate for VCs who came of age in the most recent decade as "born in the crossfire of a hurricane." (Our heart goes out to Ehrlich and we’d likely be far more sympathetic--if we weren’t in the publishing industry.)

For biotechs looking for financing, things are a bit more hopeful, thanks to the rise of corporate venture groups, including newly formed units from Boehringer Ingelheim and Abbott. But certainly expectations must be adjusted. In terms of exits, Alison Kiley of Alta Partners is telling her firms to "keep their heads down, operating as if there will be NO IPOs." And, as IVB has said in the past, the shift is away from big M&A to back-end licensing deals, with pharmas using their leverage to make smaller biotechs share the risk and cost of early stage drug development. Still, a negative discussion about the rise of option-based deals in the final panel of the first day suggests many in our own industry are refusing to face up to the new economic realities.

In the words of the immortal Charles Darwin, it’s worth remembering that "It is not the strongest of the species that survives, nor the most intelligent that survives. It is the one that is most adaptable to change."

Of course, VCs and early stage biotechs aren’t the only ones who need to adapt. J&J and BP come to mind as well. On that cheery note...we break for a holiday weekend and no more tsk-tsking from your mother for wearing white shoes. It's time to fire up the barbecue, crack open a cold one, and turn on the tunes (The Ramones "I want to be sedated" and Greed Day's "Basket Case" come to mind.) All the while reading another edition of …

Sanofi-Aventis/ Nichi-Iko: Sanofi’s deal team has been on a role, especially when it comes to inking very early stage collaborations (see below) or tie-ups with players in the consumer and generics spaces. (So much for the coming M&A storm, eh?) The French drug maker continues its eastward march, moving from Poland to Japan this week with a joint venture with one of the top Japanese generics’ firms, Nichi-Iko. Sanofi-Aventis owns 51% of the new J/V which is less than creatively named Sanofi-Aventis Nichi-Ikko K.K. (we’re guessing the abbreviation of choice will be SANI not SANK.) One of the J/V’s top initial priorities will be to rake over marketing and distribution rights in Japan for Sanofi’s anti-insomnia medicine Amoban, which generated 2009 sales of roughly €43 million. As our sister publication PharmAsia News has noted many a time, western pharmas are increasingly interested in tapping into the Japanese generics market because of a series of national policies that are encouraging generic drug use. (Japanese cos are interested too; hence Daiichi’s desire in 2008 to take partial ownership of Ranbaxy.) Pfizer, Merck, and Novartis have all made forays into the Japanese generics market, as has Teva. In allying with Nichi-Iko, Sanofi gains a considerable footprint in the island nation. Nichi-Iko owns five distribution centers and supplies drugs to 120,000 medical facilities in Japan. Last month the company reported generic sales grew 13.7%, with net profits up 103.9% for the quarter ending in February.—Ellen Foster Licking

Sanofi-Aventis/Massachusetts Institute of Technology: Another week, another corporate/academic research collaboration surfaces. This week it’s Sanofi-Aventis’ turn to make headlines, announcing a three-year, $4.2 million research collaboration with MIT’s Center for Biomedical Innovation. The collaboration's initial focus will be in the areas of nanotechnology and biologics. Although no funding has been awarded yet, the pharma is most interested in emerging technologies that provide new solutions for patients, such as next-generation nanoparticles for drug delivery, novel sensor technologies for diagnostic purposes, needle-free and wireless drug-delivery tools, and devices that monitor clinically relevant metabolites and biomarkers. As such, it fits Sanofi’s evolving belief that the drug companies of the future will be those that provide not just pharmaceuticals but end-to-end health care solutions in the vein of its recent acquisition of glucose monitoring play AgaMatrix. The MIT partnership will build on Sanofi's existing presence in Cambridge, Mass., which includes a 60-person research center and the company's vaccine subsidiary, Sanofi Pasteur Biologics. With Big Pharma companies looking at ways to reduce R&D spending, low-risk partnerships with academia and startup drug companies, in which drug makers get access to external R&D for a nominal price, are becoming more common. Pfizer recently announced a five-year tie up with Washington University in which university researchers are granted access to Pfizer compounds and data in a reprofiling effort. In the case of Sanofi's alliance with MIT, a joint steering committee will allocate annual grants ranging from $100,000 to $150,000 to academic researchers, with the French pharma holding an option on any completed research to fund further work.—Joseph Haas

Clovis/Avila: Clovis Oncology, which raised an impressive $145 million Series A in 2009, has partnered with three-year old Avila Therapeutics to develop and commercialize Avila's preclinical epidermal growth factor receptor (EGFR) mutant-selective inhibitor (EMSI) and a companion diagnostic. Under the terms of the deal, Avila and Clovis will collaborate on the preclinical development of the drug, which is being tested as a potential non-small cell lung cancer therapy. Clovis bears responsibility—and cost—for the drug’s clinical development and commercialization, as well as for the creation of the diagnostic. Total biobucks associated with the deal are $209 million, with Avila receiving an undisclosed upfront fee. For Clovis, the deal, announced May 25, marks the second asset the company has acquired since its initial financing. The company-- led by Pat Mahaffy and a band of cohorts formerly from the oncology play Pharmion--was formed with the aim of in-licensing oncology drug candidates in clinical development and pushing them through to commercialization. In November 2009, Mahaffy’s company bought Clavis Pharma’s Phase II lipid-conjugated formula of Eli Lilly's chemotherapy Gemzar (gemcitabine) in development for pancreatic cancer for $15 million upfront. In both the Avila and Clavis deals, the importance of a companion diagnostic targeting the appropriate patients has been a central part of the deal logic. Whether or not Clovis does the actual dx development is a different question. Earlier this year, Clovis signed a deal with Roche's Ventana Medical Systems, Inc. to develop and commercialize the diagnostic for the gemcitabine compound.—Jessica Merrill

Gentiva/Odyssey Healthcare: IVB doesn’t typically devote much space to healthcare services but the size of the Gentiva/Odyssey tie-up makes it impossible to ignore. Gentiva is a major provider of home health care services, while Odyssey is one of the leaders in hospice care in the U.S. Both companies have strong balance sheets and scale, so as Daily Finance writer Tom Tauli put it "assuming the integration is seamless, the result will be a powerful combination." Gentiva will spend about $1 billion to bring Odyssey’s 20 in-patient facilities and 92 Medicare-certified programs in-house, as well as the ability to provide a seamless transition from in-home care to end-of-life care. The $27-a-share price for Odyssey represents a 40% premium to the company’s closing stock price on Friday May 21, the day before the merger was announced. Hospice care is a relative new industry but one of increasing importance, given the aging demographics in the U.S. Analysts have been debating the merits of combining hospice and home-based care for some time, with proponents emphasizing synergies in shared referral and recruitment sources and marketing staff. Certainly the recent regulatory scrutiny over home health-care billing practices may have encouraged Gentiva to diversify, especially after it divested non-core assets in respiratory and infusion therapy back in February. Still, according to the WSJ, at least one analyst, Arthur Henderson of Jefferies & Co., was "taken aback by the magnitude" of the deal, Gentiva’s first in the hospice space. "We view this deal as an indication of management’s renewed vigor in driving accelerated growth through an aggressive acquisition strategy," Henderson said.--EFL

Image courtesy of flickrer vasta used with permission through a creative commons license.

Ed. Note: Let's Go Flyers!